friendly to Brussels. 5 The Eurostat contributes some of the (aggregate) European data that national statistical services systematically neglect, for which reason Europe is somewhat unknown to Europeans, including scholars cherishing methodological nationalism.
The EEAS employs different means of communication, reflecting the variation of the audiences it aims to reach. The EEAS website is one such tool, both a means in its own right and a gateway to a rich variety of communication channels and forms. Ashton and top EEAS officials give speeches, and her staff issues statements and provides news. 6 Presumably they are involved in drafting both
Council of Ministers and European Council conclusions. Ashton might also, as Vice-President of the European Commission, be involved in authorizing mandates for white papers, green papers, communications and other kinds of policy documents.
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This article aims at understanding the significance of this kind of institutional communication and how it resonates with existing discourses on foreign affairs. It does so by bridging two avenues of research: one avenue focusing on relations between elite and public, and a second avenue focusing on foreign policy traditions -thus illustrating some of the arguments that Caterina Carta and Jean-Frederic Morin have emphasized (Introduction to this special issue). 8 In research on the relationship between foreign policy and public opinion, Gabriel Almond's (1960) distinction between a 'general public', an 'attentive public' and a 'policy and opinion elite' has proved to be of lasting value. 9 According to Almond's slightly provocative claim, the general public does not understand and, in any case, does not care about foreign policy, except perhaps during crises. The attentive public is a fairly exclusive and educated segment of the general public, and the elite can interact with the attentive public, at least in terms of more general or abstract reasoning. The policy and opinion elite comprises several groupings -diplomats, journalists, politicians, academics -who know to various degrees the insights and rationales of policies and are thus in a perfect position to interact within the elite as well as with the attentive public.
The present article focuses first and foremost on the interaction between the policy and opinion elite (POE) and the attentive public (AP) -not all types of interaction, but specifically discursive interaction. How does the policy and opinion elite articulate European foreign policy to the attentive public? Which abstract idioms, symbols or (historical) analogies are being employed, and which idioms are typically at the hearts and minds of the attentive public? In this context, the article examines the issue of contested discourses between, within and especially across EU member states, arguing that significant insight can be gained by means of analysing contested discourses within member states, including the degree to which these discourses have a transnational nature. In this respect, the article focuses on themes similar to those analysed by Caterina Carta and Thomas Diez (both in this special issue), even if the approach is slightly different. Subsequently, the article explicates two key terms, public philosophy and mythology, highlighting their crucial importance for the objectives of this article. The article then turns to what could be labelled 'discursive shareware', i.e. the overlaps that exist between different levels and segments of discourse.
Contested discourses between and within EU member states
Research on foreign policy and discourse has frequently focused on national discourses and their impact on political approaches to European foreign policy (Hellmann, 1996; Larsen, 1997; Aggestam, 2004 ; see also Larsen's contribution to this special issue). This literature can be seen as a discursive variant of research on the interplay between national and European foreign policy (Hill, 1983; Wong and Hill, 2011; Manners and Whitman, 2000; , i.e., research emphasizing the significance of national foreign policy for the genesis and dynamics of European foreign policy.
While this literature has proved to be highly informative and is probably the best available on relations between member states and EU foreign policy, it is also characterized by a number of weaknesses.
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In the first place, it tends to reify the national, thereby downplaying the contested nature of both national and, to a lesser extent, European foreign policy. Moreover, it focuses on only one dimension of contested policy, i.e., it highlights how foreign policy is contested among EU member states and downplays different worldviews and preferred foreign policy directions within member states. Finally, it somehow downplays processes of Europeanization, that is, the impact of Europe on member states' institutions and policymaking processes. These tendencies constitute classic examples of analytical trade-offs, obviously implying that the alternative is also characterized by its own distinct configuration of strengths and weaknesses.
The second potential source of inspiration is the huge body of literature that we label foreign policy analysis (FPA). It is nothing else but overwhelming in terms of scholarship (Hudson 19952005) . Reaching back to the 1950s, it has a long tradition and a mutually constitutive relationship with International Relations as a discipline; given the incredible range of approaches and theories within FPA, it can be considered an analytical goldmine that awaits its European golddiggers; its numerous examples of best practice studies suggest it should be an obligatory first stop source of inspiration. However, interfaces between the FPA tradition and research on European foreign policy are very limited (Carlsnaes and Smith 1994; White, 2001; Carlsnaes, White and Sjursen eds. 2004; Carlsnaes 2007 (Carr, 2001 (Carr, [1939 (Haslam, 2000; Sylvest, 2007; Hence, criticism of liberal internationalism seems to be a constant (see also Paris, 1997) . As both Carr and Morgenthau are famous early representatives of the realist theoretical tradition, we witness here also an example of the connection between theoretical orientation and criticism of political practice, including the discursive dimension of political practice.
Criticism of the opposite political position has, likewise, been a constant. There is a long discursive line from Norman Angell's criticism of power politics, via Ernst Haas' criticism of the notion of balance of power, to Mario Bettati and Bernard Kouchner's (1987) argument for an international right to intervene, provided interventions are prompted by humanitarian concerns. A fairly similar reasoning is behind R2P, the newly established principle of a responsibility to protect (see Knudsen, 2013 There are other distinct European foreign policy traditions -e.g. isolationism, commercial internationalism and the tradition cherishing development policy -but in the present context, we do not need to go into further detail (see Jørgensen, 2013) . We have already seen how politicians and academics make use of distinct idioms -e.g. 'utopian idealism', 'Munich', 'Maginot' -when analysing a given state of affairs or characterizing their opponents. In other words, when addressing their attentive public, they make use of certain discourses, and because the attentive public has certain insights into foreign affairs we can speak about a certain discursive shareware. Before examining discursive shareware, two follow-up questions should be addressed.
Recalling that Almond wrote about foreign affairs within a state, one question concerns the degree to which national experiences can be or are replicated at the European level. This might be difficult. According to Vivien Schmidt, 'the lack of connection between spheres of discourse is a frequent occurrence in the European Union' (Schmidt, 2008: 311) . According to Paul Statham, options for such replication are limited:
Applying this formula to a Europeanized politics, we believe that the "attentive public" has been very much smaller than it usually is in domestic politics. This is supported by our findings that civil society mobilization is weak in discursive influence. A consequence of this very small attentive public from civil society over Europe is that the mass media has taken center stage as the actor representing the public (2010: 301).
Though this conclusion concerns European integration, it is difficult to see why it should not also apply to the field of foreign policy, perhaps even more so than for European politics as such.
Essentially we do not know whether this is the case, particularly because the triangle consisting of 'discourse', 'public opinion' and 'foreign policy' has been under-researched. The first legdiscourse-public opinion -is first and foremost characterized by a remarkable gap, if not an ocean, between discourse-oriented scholars who work within the interpretive tradition and, on the other hand, scholars working in the tradition of positivist empiricism. Bridges between these two worlds apart are extremely rare. The second leg -discourse-foreign policy -has caught some attention, cf. the examples provided above, but these examples are exceptions to the rule that foreign policy analysts 'don't do discourse analysis' and vice versa. The third leg -public opinion-foreign policyis of some significance concerning national foreign policy, American foreign policy not least of all, but is almost absent when it comes to European foreign policy. Officials at the EEAS will have a hard time finding data on Europeans' opinions on or attitudes to European foreign policy.
In short, we might find a fragmented public sphere and a relatively limited attentive public in Europe. Existing research points in this direction, yet further study is needed in order to reach a more decisive conclusion. This potentially fragmented public sphere can be seen as bad for processes of public deliberation on the direction of European foreign policy. Yet analytically, it should make the task of understanding the dynamics of European foreign policy relatively easier.
Seemingly, such understandings have to be complemented by studies of media coverage of foreign affairs.
The second question is whether the foreign policy traditions and their key idioms somehow connect to the EEAS. The answer is that it varies. Members of the isolationist (often nationalist and populist, though not always) tradition generally do not aim at influencing the direction of European foreign policy. They aim at destroying it, thereby performing the role of the enemy within. When examining the foreign policy thinking within Le Pen's Front National, among UKIPs, segments of British Conservatives, Vaclav Klauses and Kazcinskis, Lega Nordists, Vlaams Blok and Scandinavian progress parties, studies consistently conclude that their discourse is not only directed at their political opponents but also at the institutions that have been built and are occupied by political opponents (see Swyngedouw et al., 2007) . Studies also conclude that isolationist populists generally do not care about global affairs, except when certain debates (for example, border issues)
can be politicized. It should be added that not all European nationalists are hostile to the EU: indeed both the Lega Nord and the Front National were once friends of the EU, the former finding the role of EU regions attractive, the latter using the EU instrumentally in its blatant anti-Americanism.
Catalan, Basque, Scottish and Welsh nationalists, to mention just a few, turn their criticism towards their national capitals and the politics they represent, not Brussels. While the EU might function as a partner vis-à-vis national capitals, European foreign policy is for these nationalists often a horizon too far.
For members of the commercial internationalist foreign policy tradition, the EEAS might be of interest but it is DG Trade that is of crucial importance -not least when representing European commercial interests, e.g. in negotiations of bilateral trade agreements or during deliberations within multilateral institutions. As commercial interests can be promoted or protected by different means, the tradition is split along a range of lines, e.g. free traders vs. protectionists.
No matter the differences between and within traditions, data are available and the traditions can be researched and, to some degree, already have been. The advantage is that a focus on foreign policy traditions avoids the traps of methodological nationalism. The analytical challenge is to connect research on foreign policy traditions, discourse and the EEAS.
Public Philosophies
One important notion for this article is public philosophy, coined by Samuel H. Beer (1978) , Political rhetoric is often characterized by vague notions, ambiguity and generous inconsistency, leaving plenty of space for connotation (for a thorough analysis of the discrete charm of ambiguity, see Reyroux, this special issue). Often, it is precisely such qualities that make political rhetoric work. Let us now turn to Paul Schumaker, who explains that 'Public philosophies, like political ideologies, provide fairly comprehensive and coherent sets of ideas about politics. Both provide beliefs about how political communities are governed, ideals about the goals that should be sought by political communities, and principles providing broad guidelines for achieving those goals' (Schumaker, 2008: 1) . Schumaker not only defines public philosophy, he also provides a framework for generating, describing and analysing public philosophies. He emphasizes that public philosophies are promising for public policy debates that can function as an alternative to ideological warfare.
The notion of public philosophy provides direction and guidelines, especially concerning what to look for, and is therefore immensely helpful for research into the discursive dimensions of foreign policy.
Mythologies
The second important notion is mythology. While at a superficial level myth is considered the antithesis of reality, I employ the notion of mythology in a fashion that is inspired by anthropology.
In this context, mythology is reality. It is telling that Roland Barthes (2000) has thoroughly examined the nature of mythology. It is equally telling that it takes an anthropologist to state the following, "In general one is struck by the lack of European symbolism. What we can call a symbolic deficit corresponds to the absence of a coherent set of political concepts and discourse.
Everything is working as if Europe was destined to remain a virtual object (Abeles, 2004) . Within sociological institutionalism, myth and ceremonial features also play an important role (March and Olsen, 1989 ; for similarities to discursive institutionalism, see Smith, this special issue). It could be said that several of the connections to foreign policy traditions were introduced above.
This said, it remains a challenge to conduct research on imagination and faith and the role of these features within the field of foreign affairs. Did we academics get the function of notions such as 'civilian power Europe', 'Europe as a model' or 'European values' right? Did we not examine the degree to which these notions match European realities, as if these realities were different from the realm of mythology? However, and following Kane, if the domain of myth is not empirical reality but imagination, then the contending processes of meaning formation should be our primary field of study (cf. Thomas Diez' contribution to this special issue). At the very least, we should be able to make analytical distinctions between the mythological and policy levels of European foreign policy.
Discursive shareware
Communication between POE and AP is largely handled by means of abstract concepts, symbols, principles and a range of mythologies, i.e., by means of what sometimes, cf. above, is called public philosophies. Such philosophies are shared, but only more or less. In order to understand the function of public philosophies, it might be helpful to distinguish between four levels.
 The level of foreign policy traditions. These typically have their own distinct categories and idioms, and the degree of discursive shareware with other traditions is somewhat limited.
Exactly how limited depends on specific traditions and circumstances, and this varies over time (Holbraad 2003; Mead, 2002; Nau, 2002; Sylvest, 2009  At the global level, the United Nations can be regarded a site for norm production and the EU can be seen as a norm-taker (Human rights, R2P, the Millennium Development Goals, the alliance of civilizations concept, etc.) (see Barnett and Finnemore, 2004) . It is not only the UN that provides norms and principles for the EU to download. Within the field of development policy, the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and the World
Bank perform a similar function (Carroll and Kellow, 2013) . Within the field of nonproliferation, the EU has proved to be very active in downloading norms and principles, yet has demonstrated limited capacity to make and implement policies (van Ham, 2011; Kienzle and Vestergaard, 2013) . These examples illustrate the significance of discourses in international affairs, but also the fact that the EU does not always speak. Sometimes, the EU listens, and adopts or adapts to global norms. Institutions at the sub-global level also play a role, for example NATO's role as a model for the EU in defence matters and the role of the United States in triggering the rationale for the 2003 European Security Strategy (Biscop, 2005) , including its emphasis on WMD and terrorism as main threats to European security.
Indeed, the very notion of having a strategy to guide policymaking was subsequently copied by some EU member states, especially France, Germany and the United Kingdom.
In the context of this distinction between four (and a half) levels, three issues merit closer attention.
The first concerns the relationship between POE and AP. In Europe, the AP seems to be rather compartmentalized, partly because each level has its distinct constituencies, partly because communication tends to take place in different languages and, finally, because the European foreign policy tradition has been cultivated at a certain distance from both the general and the attentive public. Notably, the tradition in question is different from what is otherwise referred to as tradition in this article. reflected in public discourses. While these discourses rarely follow party division lines, indeed that is one of the reasons party leaders employ compartmentalization in the sense used by Aylott, the discourses do provide bridges of understanding between the POE and the AP. Research on the two types of compartmentalization seems therefore complementary rather than competitive. A joint research agenda appears therefore highly promising.
The second issue concerns the relationship between public philosophy and foreign policy.
Whether they contribute to uploading or downloading, public philosophies do not explain foreign policy as such, i.e., as policy. However, they do help us to better understand reasons for action, i.e., the process of legitimizing European foreign policy. As foreign policy is a broad church, all sorts of reasons come into play, for instance an ethics of responsibility, obligations we owe to a third-party or to ourselves as Europeans, historical analogies (e.g. European integration as the antithesis to European power politics ), the dialectical construction of Self and Others (anti-Americanism, antiMuslim, anti-Soviet, libertarian heavens). In this fashion, public philosophies help us understand how the politics of foreign policy is organized. In order to do so it might be helpful to employ the notions of uploading and downloading. When actors make reference to a certain public philosophy they download for instance principles that guide operational policy-making. By contrast, uploading happens when a foreign policy instrument is turned into a principle, when means become ends an end. Thus, negotiations can be considered a means in the conduct of foreign affairs, yet can also be turned into an end in itself, for instance opposing the employment of coercive means. The notions of uploading and downloading can be traced back to the early theories of European integration, cf.
neofunctionalism and its focus on the likelihood of national competences being uploaded to a European political community. Over time such uploading might be followed by processes of downloading, cf. the effects of international institutions in neoliberal institutionalism (Keohane 1989) or the effects of the Euro-polity on national institutions and processes of policy-making (Börzel 2002) .They help us understand how the politics of foreign policy is organized.
The third issue concerns the increased public philosophy activity at the global or international (or, rather, transnational) level, not least the increasing number and multiple kinds of actors involved. The emergence and importance of transnational actors have been demonstrated in, e.g., the processes leading to the establishment of the International Criminal Court, the adoption of the R2P, the formulation of the Millennium Development Goals, the treaty ban on anti-personnel landmines and the treaty on small firearms (Krause, 2002; Long, 2002; Groenleer and Rijks, 2009 ).
The increased activity and the emergence of new kinds of actors might imply that representatives of traditional foreign policy traditions feel challenged, not least because they no longer seem to enjoy a monopoly on defining directions and means or on controlling communication. There might occasionally have been certain tensions between representatives of foreign policy traditions and professional diplomats, but the new challenge is very different. Parts of the European attentive public subscribe to international actors and communicators, and sometimes the EU chooses to do the same. Hence, the EU is not only a nation writ large, projecting its values and interests. It is also a micro-cosmos of the world, reflecting the global normative superstructure in a second-image reversed fashion. 13 The EU might be the world region that most consistently contributes and subscribes to global norms and, in addition, seeks to promote these norms globally.
Analytical Potentials and Limits
In general, the attentive public employs public philosophy concepts and is sufficiently attentive to understand the significance of the concepts employed by the policy and opinion elite. Almond did not use the notions of public philosophy and mythology, and he did not write about Europe.
However, the employment of public philosophy and mythology does not seem to cause serious problems as it is merely a question of providing more refinement and nuance. By contrast, the application of his ideas to the case of Europe does provide some serious analytical challenges.
14 The attentive public, to the degree it makes sense to keep the notion in the singular form, does not know where, exactly, to look for the policy and opinion elite's discursive communication. Barber, 2010; Duke, 2010; Vanhoonacker and Reslow, 2011; Carta, this special issue) . While the media find member states' criticisms of the EEAS worthy to report, they find considerably less 'news quality' in policy reviews of, e.g., the European Neighbourhood Policy.
Importantly, the policy and opinion elite is a composite entity. Its policy segment is collective in decision-making (when decisions are possible), yet often separate when legitimizing political positions and actions. Legitimizing is not often, 'Why did we decide to take European foreign policy in direction X' but rather, 'How I managed to safeguard aspect Y, precious to all of us, the people of country Z'. Despite the fact that the policy and opinion elite is a composite entity and that analytically, or writing about policies A, B or C without examining which kind of policy, if any, the declared policies represent. As previously demonstrated, there are significant gaps between practitioners' and analysts' discourses; the former refers to median line politics (e.g. Nuttall, 1992; , the latter refers endlessly to lowest common denominator politics (Jørgensen, 1997) .
In the European context, the policy and opinion elite is to a considerable degree an abstraction, not least because the policy and opinion elites seem to live in worlds apart. Concerning European foreign policy, some media editors and commentators subscribe to two doctrines of European foreign policy: 'Does not exist' and 'Does exist but is bound to fail', i.e. distinct discourses in their own right (see Jørgensen, 2004) . Other segments of the media tend to follow national politicians' example and, perhaps with a view to segments of media markets, tell their readers 'the national story', the story from the perspective of country X or the 'what's in it for us' story. Some academics tend to summarize media coverage (especially in the English language), not regarded as a discourse to be analysed, but as a shortcut to sources of the true state of affairs. Thus, their studies become merely a concentrate of media coverage, especially coverage by English-language media.
Sometimes the policy elite seem to believe that it is sufficient to download global principles and add declaratory policies and some administrative programmes to constitute a world-class international player. No wonder they are less than keen to legitimize their political actions, leading us to a state of affairs in which there is limited policy discourse to analyse.
Conclusion
The discursive processes of constructing European foreign policy have increased in terms of both scope and density. Over time, ever more policy areas have been included in the politics of European foreign policy, and ever more dense discursive fabrics are being woven by the policy and opinion elite. In other words, an ever-more impressive dataset avails itself for analysis. However, relatively few analysts have engaged in this field of research. While the dynamics of policymaking have been documented in numerous studies, the dynamics of the politics of European foreign policy has attracted limited interest. 15 This article has pointed to potential points of departure, including a focus on foreign policy traditions and the public philosophies, mythologies and world views they make use of. Drawing on Almond's classic study, a distinction was made between, on the one hand, the policy and opinion elite and, on the other hand, the public (divided into the attentive and the general public). Moreover, the analytical perspective was changed from the one characterizing the dominant (vertical) mode of analysis to a horizontal perspective on the politics of European foreign policy. Subsequently, the article outlined analytical potentials, that is, reflections on the feasibility of a number of avenues of research. While not underestimating the degree to which the policy and opinion elite as well as the attentive public are compartmentalized, it was argued that Almond's concept is applicable in studies of the politics of European foreign policy. Moreover, the article pointed to the promise of engaging analytically with the discursive practices of the EEAS and other key European institutions.
